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Previous research suggests that children infer the presence of unobserved causes when
objects appear to move spontaneously. Are such inferences limited to motion events or
do children assume that unexplained physical events have causes more generally? Here
we introduce an apparently spontaneous event and ask whether, even in the absence
of spatiotemporal and co-variation cues linking the events, toddlers treat a plausible
variable as a cause of the event. Toddlers (24 months) saw a toy that appeared to light
up either spontaneously or after an experimenter’s action. Toddlers were also introduced
to a button but were not shown any predictive relation between the button and the light.
Across three different dependent measures of exploration, predictive looking (Study 1),
prompted intervention (Study 2), and spontaneous exploration (Study 3), toddlers were
more likely to represent the button as a cause of the light when the event appeared
to occur spontaneously. In Study 4, we found that even in the absence of a plausible
candidate cause, toddlers engaged in selective exploration when the light appeared to
activate spontaneously. These results suggest that toddlers’ exploration is guided by the
causal explanatory power of events.
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INTRODUCTION
Hume (1739/1978) famously claimed that we never actually see
causal events. All we observe are a set of predictive relations. One
billiard ball strikes another and the second one moves. A baseball
player swings a bat at a baseball and the baseball soars over the
outﬁeld wall. However, the human mind represents these events
as causal relations, and not only with respect to simple physical
events but with relations that are harder to visualize: smoking
causes lung cancer, the moon’s movement causes the tide to ebb
and ﬂow, and the baseball player causes the team to score a run.
The ability to represent events causally shapes much of learning
and development.
There have been multiple ways of looking at children’s causal
inference, focusing variously on reasoning about spatiotemporal
properties of causal events, the dispositional status of the entities
involved in causal events, domain-speciﬁc theories about causal
relationships, and domain-general abilities to integrate these the-
ories with patterns of evidence. For example, researchers have
tested infants’ sensitivity to spatiotemporal parameters (e.g., phys-
ical contact and temporal immediacy), showing that small changes
in these events (spatial gaps and temporal delays) change infants’
percept from a causal event to a non-causal event (Leslie, 1982,
1984a; Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Oakes and Cohen, 1990; Cohen
and Oakes, 1993; Oakes, 1994; Cohen and Amsel, 1998; Kotovsky
and Baillargeon, 2000; Belanger and Desrochers, 2001; Newman
et al., 2008). Other research has looked at children’s intuitive the-
ories of the physical, psychological, and biological worlds (Carey,
1985; Spelke et al., 1992; Wellman and Gelman, 1992; Inagaki and
Hatano, 1993; Kalish, 1996; Gopnik and Wellman, 2012), showing
that children have domain-speciﬁc expectations for physical and
psychological causality. Infants are also sensitive to the ontological
status of participants in causal events, changing their represen-
tations depending on whether the entities are objects or agents
(Leslie, 1984b; Woodward et al., 1993; Kotovsky and Baillargeon,
2000; Kosugi and Fujita, 2002; Kosugi et al., 2003; Saxe et al., 2005,
2007; Luo et al., 2009; Muentener and Carey, 2010) Finally, many
researchers have looked at how children’s folk theories are inte-
grated with patterns of data to support prediction, intervention,
explanation, and counterfactual reasoning across domains (Gop-
nik et al., 2004; Schulz and Gopnik, 2004; Kushnir and Gopnik,
2007; Schulz et al., 2007; Sobel and Munro, 2009; Bonawitz et al.,
2010, 2012; Kushnir et al., 2010; Legare, 2012).
Underlying all these questions, however, is the assumption that
humans come to treat the world in terms of causal relationships,
including unobserved causal relationships, rather than simply as
sets of observable events. The abstract expectation that all events
have causes may be a core feature of human cognition, emerging
very early in development. In the current paper, we look atwhether
toddlers represent events as having plausible candidate causes in
the absence of any spatiotemporal cues or data itself indicative
of a causal relationship. In particular, we ask whether toddlers
believe that unexplained, seemingly spontaneous physical events
have causes.
Prior research suggests that by the ageof ﬁve, childrendo tend to
assume that spontaneously occurring physical events have causes.
In classic research on causal reasoning, researchers showed that
5-year-olds denied that a physical outcome could occur spon-
taneously (Bullock et al., 1982). When asked to explain a novel,
apparently spontaneous jack-in-the-box event, no child suggested
that the event occurred on its own. Rather, all children referred to
hidden variables (e.g., wires, remote controls, or “invisible bat-
teries”). Similarly, researchers showed that 5-year-olds posited
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hidden variables when causes appeared to act probabilistically
(Schulz and Sommerville, 2006).
Research conducted on younger children, however, presents a
more complex picture. Much of the research on infants’ intuitive
theories about objects’ physical interactions and agents’ goal-
directed actions suggests that they may believe that spontaneous
events have causes. For example, 5- to 6.5-month-old infants infer
that a box that moves without contact by a human hand can also
switchdirection, resist force, and change location (Luo et al.,2009).
The researchers suggest that infants in these studies infer that the
box is a ‘self-propelled agent,’ and that its motion is internally
caused. Similarly, researchers have shown that infants will treat
inanimate objects as if they are engaging in goal-directed behavior
if the objects can spontaneously alter their direction of motion
(Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Biro and Leslie, 2007; Johnson et al.,
2007). Such studies suggest that infants categorize entities as either
agents or objects depending on their pattern of behavior, includ-
ing the likelihood of spontaneous movement and spontaneous
changes in trajectory. However, these studies do not speciﬁcally
ask infants to reason about the causes of apparently spontaneous
behavior. Rather, these studies focus on whether infants believe
that some properties of agents predict other properties of agents
(e.g., if something moves without external force, should it also
be able to change direction). Infants might have domain-speciﬁc
cues to agency along with a set of domain-speciﬁc inferences about
agents, but still fail to posit causes for apparently spontaneous
events in objects.
Saxe et al. (2005, 2007) provide stronger evidence that infants
infer causes for apparently spontaneous physical events. If a bean-
bag emerges in motion, infants, by around 10 months of age, seem
to infer that an unseen agent generated the movement. Infants
are less surprised if a hand emerges at the origin of the motion
trajectory than at its terminus, and this inference only holds for
agents (plausible candidate causes of the motion), not for objects
(e.g., toy trains). That is, infants seem both to resist the idea that
the object can move spontaneously and to consider the possibility
of hidden causes.
These studies suggest that infants expect agents to initiate
motion events. However, we do not know to what extent such
inferences extend beyond motion events. Moreover, infants might
ﬁnd the appearance of one candidate cause more plausible than
the other (the hand at the appropriate location versus the wrong
location) without necessarily positing the existence of a cause in
the ﬁrst place. Indeed if infants require observed covariation data,
contact causality, or observed interventions for causal inference
(see e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Leslie and Keeble, 1987;
Gopnik et al., 2004), then there is no reason to suppose that the
mere appearance of a spontaneous event should sufﬁce for them
to infer causal relationships. By contrast, if infants assume that
apparently spontaneous events have causes, we might expect them
to (1) look predictively between the activation of the candidate
cause and the outcome and (2) selectively intervene on candidate
causes given otherwise unexplained events. We test these two pre-
dictions in the current study. Because our measures extend beyond
looking time, herewe test toddlers (24months) rather than infants.
In the current study, we introduce toddlers to a causal event: a
toy box that lights up either when contacted by the experimenter
(Observed condition) or spontaneously (Spontaneous condition).
We then reveal a previously hidden candidate cause: a button phys-
ically connected to the box. Toddlers’prior knowledge is consistent
with the possibility that the button might activate the light: but-
tons are a plausible cause of the light’s activation much as hands
are a plausible cause of the beanbag’s motion. However, toddlers
never see the button associated with the light activation. We pre-
dict that toddlers will treat the button differently depending on
whether the light apparently turned on after the experimenter’s
intervention or spontaneously. In the Observed condition, we pre-
dict that toddlers will neither look predictively from the button to
the light, nor selectively intervene on the button; the observed
intervention provides a plausible cause for the event. By contrast,
if toddlers resist spontaneous events and assume that there was
an unobserved cause of the light’s activation, then in the Spon-
taneous condition, toddlers should both predictively look toward
the light when the button is pushed, and selectively intervene on
the button.
Importantly, while toddlers view the spontaneous causal event,
no goal-directed action immediately precedes the events occur-
rence, the button is occluded from the child’s view, and no other
event predicts the toy lighting up. Thus, although the button is a
plausible candidate causewith respect to toddlers’domain-speciﬁc
prior knowledge, toddlers are given neither spatiotemporal cues
connecting the button to the light, nor conditional probability evi-
dence for a causal relationship between the button and the light.
If toddlers always connect plausible causes with their outcomes,
they should do so both in the Observed and Spontaneous condi-
tions; however, if toddlers selectively search for plausible causes
given otherwise unexplained events, they should be more likely to
connect the cause with the light (in both prediction and action) in
the Spontaneous condition.
In the current study, we use three different measures to assess
toddlers’ causal inferences. In Experiment 1, we ask whether
toddlers infer a predictive relation between the button and the
outcome only when it occurs spontaneously by measuring their
predictive looking following an action on the button. In Experi-
ment 2, we prompt toddlers to turn on the light and assess whether
they press the button. In Experiment 3, we do not prompt toddlers
and assess whether they spontaneously attempt to cause the light
to activate by pressing the button. Finally, in Experiment 4, we
look at whether toddlers search for candidate causes of sponta-
neous physical events even when no plausible mechanism such as
a button is available.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1 we use a predictive looking paradigm to see
whether toddlers selectively connect plausible candidate causes
with otherwise apparently spontaneously occurring events. Tod-
dlers are introduced to a novel toy box and shown that a light on
the box ﬂashes on. Half the toddlers are given a plausible cause
of the light’s activation: the experimenter touches the box and the
light turns on (Observed condition); research suggests that even
infants treat intentional contact by a human hand as a plausible
cause for an artifact changing state (Muentener and Carey, 2010).
The remaining toddlers are not given a plausible cause and thus the
light appears to activate spontaneously (Spontaneous condition).
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The light is then occluded and all toddlers see the experimenter
press a button connected to the box. Thus, the toddlers do not
receive any evidence that the button press covaries with the light’s
activation. During test trials, the occluder is removed and the
experimenter presses the button; the light never activates during
the test trial. We code whether toddlers look toward the toy after
the experimenter presses the button.
Whether or not toddlers expect unexplained events to have
causes, theymight expect buttons to activate lights. If so theymight
look from the button to the light box in the Observed condition as
well as the Spontaneous condition. Indeed because the light box is
the only other artifact on the stage, they might look to the light box
even at baseline. Thus we also include a Button Control condition
in which the experimenter presses the button but the light never
activates. If toddlers look from the button to the box, not because
they are looking for a cause of the effect, but because they are
looking for an effect for the cause – or simply because the box
itself attracts their attention – then they should also look toward
the box in the Button Control condition. However, if toddlers
selectively posit causes of otherwise unexplained event, toddlers




Forty-eight toddlers (mean: 25.08 months, range – 18–30 months;
15 female) were recruited at a children’s museum. An additional
12 toddlers were recruited but not included in the ﬁnal sample due
to: inability to complete the session (n = 4), inattention (n = 1),
parental interference (n = 4), or experimenter error (n = 3). Tod-
dlers were assigned to the Observed condition, the Spontaneous
condition, or the Button Control condition (n = 16/condition).
There were no age differences between the conditions (p = ns).
Materials
The light box was constructed from a black box (6 inch ×
6 inch × 6 inch) with a small blue lamp (2 in diameter) emerging
from the front panel. The experimenter could control the light
surreptitiously by pressing a button that was out of toddlers’ view.
The button box was a small red button on top of an orange cylin-
drical case (4 inch diameter × 2 in high). Since physical contact
between candidate causes and outcomes facilitates causal reason-
ing in both infant (e.g., Cohen and Amsel, 1998) and children’s
(Kushnir and Gopnik, 2007) causal reasoning, we connected the
button box to the light box with a long orange rod (15 inch). A
black screen served as an occluder throughout the procedure. An
additional black screen was placed behind the light box to obscure
the experimenter’s surreptitious activation of the blue lamp.
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the MIT Institutional Review
Board. Toddlers were tested individually in a private testing room.
The entire experimental session was videotaped for subsequent
coding by an individual, blind to condition. The camerawas placed
to the side of the experimenter, facing the child, such that the direc-
tion of the child’s gaze could be easily coded. In the Observed and
Spontaneous conditions, the stimuli were sitting on a table when
the child entered the room. The experimenter sat behind the stim-
uli, facing the child; she placed one hand behind the light box
and black screen. The experimenter directed the child’s attention
to all components of the stimuli (the button, the connected rod,
and the light box), without labeling the speciﬁc items (e.g., “Look
at this”; Figure 1). The experimenter then placed the occluder in
front of the button box to obscure toddlers’ view. Upon placing the
occluder in front of the button box, the experimenter inconspic-
uously rested her other hand behind the occluder. Thus, although
the experimenter did not engage in any overtly intentional actions
behind the button screen from the child’s perspective, the exper-
imenter had access to all parts of the stimuli and could plausibly
have pushed the button in both conditions.
In the Observed condition, the experimenter touched the rim
of the light and then the box lit up and ﬂashed blue (four rapid
ﬂashes on and off in quick succession, approximately 1 s total). In
the Spontaneous condition, the experimenter did not touch the
box and toddlers saw the box light up and ﬂash blue apparently
spontaneously. The light was off at the end of this phase of the
experiment. In both conditions the experimenter then moved the
occluder to reveal the button box and occlude the light box. The
experimenter pushed the button for 1 s in both conditions.
The procedure was similar for toddlers in the Button Control
condition, except that when the toddlers walked into the testing
FIGURE 1 | Procedure for Experiment 1. In the Spontaneous condition,
toddlers ﬁrst saw a button box connected to a black box with a blue disk on
its front by an orange rod (Initial display). The experimenter then occluded
the button box and surreptitiously made a light on the front of the box ﬂash
(Light ﬂashes). The Observed condition differed from the Spontaneous
condition only in that the experimenter touched the light box immediately
prior to it ﬂashing. Although it appeared that the experimenter activated the
light box via contact, she actually still controlled the light box in the same
manner as the Spontaneous condition. In the Button Control condition,
toddlers did not see to what the button box was connected (i.e., the light
box). They also did not see the light ﬂash. Next, in all three conditions, the
experimenter occluded the light box and pressed the button. Finally, the
experimenter revealed the entire display and pressed the button again.
Note that although the light appears to remain ‘on’ in the ﬁgure, the light in
fact ﬂashed on and off four times before ending in the off state before
proceeding to the next phase of the experiment. Note also that in all
conditions the experimenter sat behind the stimuli, directly across from the
child, such that from the child’s perspective she could have contacted both
the button box and the light box throughout the experiment.
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room, the light box was occluded and only the button box and
the connecting rod were visible. The experimenter directed the
toddlers’attention to thebuttonwithout labeling it (“Look at this”)
and pressed the button. Therefore, the only difference between this
condition and the Spontaneous and Observed conditions was the
absence of an introduction to the light box at the start of the
experiment and the display of the light ﬂashing.
During the test trial in all conditions, the experimenter removed
the occluder so that all components were visible to the child. The
experimenter pressed the button but the light box did not activate.
Most toddlers spontaneously attended to the experimenter andher
actions throughout the experiment; if toddlers were not attending
to the experimenter at the start of the test trial, the experimenter
would use non-speciﬁc attentional statements (“Look at this”) to
re-direct the child’s attention. Thus, all toddlers were looking at
the buttonwhen the experimenter pressed button. Following prior
research using predictive looking measures (Bonawitz et al., 2010;
Muentener et al., 2012a,b) a coder, blind to condition, assessed
whether toddlers’ ﬁrst look in the 3-s window following the button
press was to the light box (which was off). A second coder, also
blind to condition, recoded 33% of the data. Inter-coder reliability
was high (κ> 0.8).
Results and Discussion
Our primary measure of interest was whether toddlers looked
toward the light box (which was inert during the test trial) fol-
lowing the experimenter pressing the button. As predicted, the
toddlers were signiﬁcantly more likely to look to the box in the
Spontaneous condition (68.75%, 11/16 toddlers) than in either
the Observed condition (25.00%, 4/16 toddlers; Fisher’s exact test,
p< 0.05) or the Button Control condition (12.50%, 2/16 toddlers;
Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.05; Figure 2). There was no signiﬁcant
difference in the number of toddlers’ that looked toward the light
box in the Observed and Button Control conditions (p = ns).
These results are consistent with the possibility that 2-year-olds
believe that unexplained physical events have causes. Even though
they had never seen any evidence that the button press and the
light co-varied, toddlers looked from the button press to the light
when the light had apparently occurred spontaneously. Toddlers
FIGURE 2 |The percentage of toddlers in each condition of Experiment
1 who looked toward the light box after the experimenter pressed the
button during the test trial.
did not look from the button press to the light box when the light
could be explained by the experimenter’s action, nor did they look
at the light box simply in response to the button press. They only
did so when they had previously seen an otherwise unexplained
event.
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that toddlers inferred a
relationship between the novel event and the candidate cause
only when there was an event to explain and that event had no
other candidate explanation. However, they do not establish that
the toddlers believed the button press actually caused the light
to activate. Additionally, the experimenter touched the light box
in the Observed condition but not in the Spontaneous condi-
tion. Arguably the experimenter’s contact with the light box in
the Observed condition might have shifted the toddlers’ attention
away from the button.
In Experiment 2, we conducted a stronger test of toddlers’ infer-
ence that unexplained physical events have causes. We looked
at whether toddlers selectively intervene on the button in the
Spontaneous condition relative to the Observed condition. We
also addressed the concern about differential contact with the
light box. In Experiment 2, the experimenter touched the light
box in both conditions: either immediately after the light acti-





Thirty-two toddlers (mean: 24.96 months, range – 18–30 months,
17 female) were recruited at a children’s museum. Seven addi-
tional toddlers were recruited but not included in the ﬁnal sample
due parental interference (n = 3) and failure to intervene (n = 4).
Toddlers were assigned to either the Spontaneous or Observed
condition (n = 16/condition). There were no age differences
between conditions (p > 0.05).
Materials
The same materials used in Experiment 1 were used in Experi-
ment 2.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with the following
changes (see Figure 3). The experimenter touched the light box
in both conditions: in the Observed condition, the experimenter
touched the light box immediately before the light activated (as
in Experiment 1); in the Spontaneous condition the experimenter
touched the light box immediately after the light turned on (so
that it looked like a response to, rather than potential cause of, the
light activating).
During the test event the experimenter did not push the button.
Instead, the experimenter pushed the stimuli toward the child and
asked the child to “make the light turn on.” Toddlers were given
30 s to interact freely with the button and light box apparatus.
A coder, blind to condition, recorded toddlers’ actions and
looking behavior. Our primary measure of interest was whether
toddlers intervened on the button within a 30-s window following
the prompt. If a child touched the button in the 30-s window, we
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FIGURE 3 | Procedure for Experiment 2. All infants ﬁrst saw that a button
was connected to a box by an orange rod. In the Spontaneous condition,
the experimenter then occluded the button and surreptitiously made a light
on the front of the box ﬂash (Light ﬂashes); immediately after the light
ﬂashed on and off, the experimenter touched the light. The Observed
condition differed from the Spontaneous condition only in that the
experimenter touched the light immediately prior to it ﬂashing. As in
Experiment 1, although it appeared that the experimenter activated the
light via contact, she actually still controlled the light in the same manner as
the Spontaneous condition. Note that although the light appears to remain
‘on’ in the ﬁgure, the light in fact ﬂashed on and off four times before
ending in the off state before proceeding to the next phase of the
experiment. Next, in both conditions, the experimenter occluded the light
box and pressed the button. Finally, the experimenter revealed the entire
display and asked the toddler to “make the light turn on.”
also coded whether the child’s ﬁrst look after touching the button
was toward the light (which was inert). Since toddlers’ attention
was usually directed at their actions, we could not assess toddlers’
predictive looks if their ﬁrst action was touching the light box.
Thus, we do not include any data assessing that behavior in this
experiment.
A second coder, also blind to condition, recoded 33% of the
data. Inter-coder reliability was high (κ> 0.8).
Results and Discussion
Our primary measure of interest was whether toddlers’ ﬁrst action
on the stimuli was directed toward the button. All toddlers directed
their ﬁrst action toward either the button or the light box. Analysis
of toddlers’ actions revealed that they were more likely to push the
button in the Spontaneous condition (81.25%, 13/16 toddlers)
than in the Observed condition (37.50%, 6/16 toddlers; Fisher’s
Exact test, p < 0.05; see Figure 4). In contrast, toddlers were
more likely to touch the box in the Observed condition (62.50%,
10/16 toddlers) than in the Spontaneous condition (18.75%, 3/16
toddlers). These results suggest that toddlers were more likely to
posit the button as a cause of the light’s activation when they did
not have an existing explanation.
It is also important to note that the experimenter contacted
both the button and the light in both the Spontaneous condition
and Observed conditions. The only difference between the con-
ditions was whether the experimenter’s action on the light could
be represented as a cause of the lights ﬂashing; in the Observed
FIGURE 4 |The percentage of toddlers in each condition of Experiment
2 whose first action on the stimuli was to contact the button.
condition it could, but in the Spontaneous condition it could
not. Thus, the toddlers differentially imitated the experimenter’s
actions depending on their causal attributions.
Taken together Experiments 1 and2 suggest that toddlers expect
spontaneously occurring events to have a cause, and that this belief
guides their visual and manual search. However, in both experi-
ments, toddlers were given the potentially relevant causal action:
pressing a button. We do not know whether toddlers in the Spon-
taneous condition (1) inferred the presence of an external cause
and actively searched for it or (2) whether they linked the two
subevents of the spontaneous light ﬂash and the button press only
after the experimenter directed the child’s attention toward the
button by pressing it. Additionally, toddlers were prompted to
“make the light turn on” during the test event, which may have
additionally cued to the child that there was a cause to the light
activation in the Spontaneous condition, even though they may
not have made such an inference prior to the prompt. If toddlers
believe strongly that unexplained events have causes, then toddlers
might also search for a candidate cause even if the experimenter
does not direct the toddlers’ attention toward the cause and directs
them to explore. We test this prediction in Experiment 3. Since in
this experiment, toddlers will not see any intervention on the but-
ton, we look both at toddlers’ ﬁrst actions and their overall pattern




Thirty two toddlers (mean: 23.16 months, range – 18–30 months;
14 female) were recruited at a children’s museum. Thirteen addi-
tional toddlers were recruited but not included in the ﬁnal sample
due to an inability to complete the session (n = 1), parental inter-
ference (n = 4), and failure to interact with the stimuli (n = 8).
Toddlers were assigned to either the Observed or Spontaneous
condition (n = 16/condition). There were no age differences
between conditions (p = ns).
Materials
The same materials used in Experiment 1 were used in Experi-
ment 3.
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Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2 except that the tod-
dler did not see the button until the test event (see Figure 5).
When the child entered the testing room, the button was already
occluded from the child’s view. Only after the toddler watched
the light activate either as a result of the Experimenter’s contact
(Observed condition) or spontaneously (Spontaneous condition)
did the Experimenter remove the screen from in front of the but-
ton. The Experimenter then told the child it was his/her turn to
play. She did not make any reference to the button and did not ask
the child to turn on the light.
A coder, blind to condition, assessed whether toddlers inter-
vened on the button within the ﬁrst 30 s of interaction with the
stimuli. The coder also coded where toddlers looked following
their ﬁrst action on the button. A second coder, also blind to con-
dition, recoded 33% of the data. Inter-coder reliability was high
(κ> 0.8).
Results and Discussion
As expected, themajority of toddlers in both conditions (Observed
condition: 75.00%, 12/16 toddlers; Spontaneous condition:
68.75%, 11/16 toddlers) directed their ﬁrst action toward the light
box. However, toddlers in both conditions continued to explore
over the 30-s test trial. During the remainder of the test trial,
toddlers were also more likely to press the button in the Sponta-
neous condition (81.25%, 13/16 toddlers) than in the Observed
condition (37.50%, 6/16 toddlers; Fisher’s Exact test, p < 0.05;
see Figure 6). Thus even though toddlers had never seen evi-
dence that the button and the light covaried, had never seen the
experimenter push the button, and were not prompted to turn on
the light, toddlers selectively explored the button when the light
seemed to activate spontaneously.
One concern with the previous experiments is that the condi-
tion differences may reﬂect reduced exploration of the button in
the Observed condition rather than selective exploration in the
Spontaneous condition. That is, toddlers may be more engaged by
the light box in the Observed conditions rather than more likely to
posit causes in the Spontaneous conditions. In Experiment 4 we
address this concern by removing the button altogether. Instead,
we compare toddlers’ exploration of the light box and a novel dis-
tractor toy that is distinct in shape and color from the light box,
FIGURE 5 | Procedure for Experiments 3.The procedure mirrored
Experiment 2, except that the toddlers never saw the button connected to
the box, and did not see the experimenter press the button. During the test
trial the experimenter revealed the entire display and told toddlers that it
was there “turn to play.”
FIGURE 6 |The percentage of toddlers in each condition of Experiment
3 who contacted the button during the 30-s test trial.
and physically unconnected to the light toy. If our results reﬂect
only selective engagement with the light box in the Observed con-
dition, then toddlers should selectively explore the light box here
as well and choose not to explore the novel toy. If instead, as we
have hypothesized, toddlers selectively search for candidate causes
in the Spontaneous condition, then in the absence of a plausi-
ble external cause such as the button, toddlers should selectively
explore the light box in the Spontaneous condition. In contrast,
although toddlers in the Observed condition should imitate the
Experimenter’s action to turn on the light (i.e., by touching the
lamp), after toddlers learn that the lamp does not turn on, they
should selectively explore the novel toy.
These predictions, however, require a caveat. Whether a learner
actually engages in search depends on many factors, including
the learner’s prior knowledge, the size of the search space, and
exploration/exploitation trade-offs relating the cost and beneﬁt of
exploration to the cost and beneﬁt of other actions the learner
might take (e.g., Gittens, 1979). If learners believe that spon-
taneous events have causes, they should posit the existence of
unobserved causes for otherwise unexplained events; however,
this does not mean that learners should necessarily search for such
causes. Even as adults, we see events every day that we cannot
explain; we may assume that these events have causes but we rarely
bother to seek out the causes ourselves. In the absence of a well-
constrained search space, the costs of such a search could easily
outweigh the potential for information gain. Nonetheless, if tod-
dlers actively search for plausible candidate causes when events
appear to occur spontaneously, then they should be more likely
to explore the light box in the Spontaneous condition than the




Thirty two toddlers (mean: 22.92 months, range – 18–30 months;
14 female) were recruited at a children’s museum. Two additional
toddlers were recruited but not included in the ﬁnal sample due
to an inability to complete the session (n = 1) and experimenter
error (n = 1). Toddlers were assigned to either the Spontaneous
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or Observed condition (n = 16/condition). There were no age
differences between conditions (p > 0.05).
Materials
The black screen and the light box from Experiments 1–3 were
both used; however, the orange button box and connecting rod
were removed. An additional custom-built toy (8 inch × 6 inch)
served as the novel, distractor toy (Figure 7).
Procedure
Upon entering the testing space, toddlers saw the light box and
the black screen (Figure 7). The screen occluded the distractor toy
from the toddler’s view. After the toddler saw the novel event occur
either spontaneously (Spontaneous condition) or as a result of the
Experimenter’s contact (Observed condition), the Experimenter
removed the screen from in front of the distractor toy, and then
told the child it was his/her turn to play. She did not make any
reference to the distractor toy and did not explicitly request that
the child turn on the light. A coder, blind to condition, coded the
amount of time the child played with the light box and with the
distractor toy in the 30-s window following the removal of the
screen. An additional coder, blind to condition, recoded 100% of
the data. Inter-coder reliability was high (r2 > 0.9).
Results and Discussion
In contrast to Experiments 2 and 3, toddlers were marginally more
likely to refuse to interact with either toy in the Spontaneous con-
dition (9/16 toddlers, 56.00%) than the Observed condition (3/16
toddlers, 18.75%; Fisher’s Exact test, p = 0.06). However, as pre-
dicted, when toddlers did play with the toys, they spent a greater
percentage of their total playtime exploring the light box in the
Spontaneous condition (98.41%) than in the Observed condition
(65.43%), t(18) = 2.06, p = 0.05 (Figure 8).
These results should be interpreted with caution, as toddlers
were less likely to play with the toys in these conditions, rela-
tive to the prior experiments, resulting in a small sample size for
our analyses. However, they are consistent with the possibility
that toddlers posit candidate causes when events appear to occur
spontaneously. As importantly, they are inconsistent with the pos-
sibility that toddlers selectively attended to the light box in the
Observed condition. Although the toddlers spent more than half
FIGURE 7 | Procedure for Experiments 4.The procedure mirrored
Experiment 3, except that the experimenter removed the occluder (which
obscured the button box in Experiments 1–3) to reveal a novel, distractor
toy. During the test trial the experimenter told toddlers that it was their
“turn to play.”
FIGURE 8 |The percentage of toddlers’ total play time of 30 s that they
interacted with the light box, separated by condition. Error bars denote
±1 SD.
their time playing with the light box in both conditions, toddlers
in the Observed condition also explored the novel toy. By con-
trast, toddlers in the Spontaneous condition explored the light
box almost exclusively.
Potentially the fact that the light box did not activate during the
test period was especially discouraging to toddlers in the Observed
condition, who had reason to expect that contact would activate
the box. Note however, that the light box also failed to activate
when toddlers intervened on it in Experiment 3. Nonetheless, in
Experiment 3 toddlers were relatively more likely to direct atten-
tion away from the light box (to the button) in the Spontaneous
condition whereas in Experiment 4 toddlers were more likely to
direct attention away from the light box (to the novel toy) in the
Observed condition. The overall pattern of results suggests that
toddlers’ differential behavior in the two conditions was driven,
not by variable attention to, or avoidance of the light box in the
Observed condition, but by a selective search for a candidate cause
when the events occurred spontaneously.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from the current study suggest that when toddlers see
a novel physical event, they are more likely to predict relation-
ships between a candidate cause and the event (Experiment 1) and
intervene on and explore plausible candidate causes (Experiment
2 and Experiment 3) if the event appears to occur spontaneously
than if they have an explanation for the event. Even when no
plausible candidate cause is provided, toddlers engage in more
exploration of the stimuli related to the event when the event
appears to occur spontaneously than when they have an explana-
tion for its occurrence (Experiment 4). Thus 2-year-olds appear to
infer that physical events have causes, and both accept and search
for plausible candidate causes of events, even in the absence of
covariation cues linking candidate causes and effects.
Prior research with older children (Bullock et al., 1982; Schulz
and Sommerville, 2006) had shown that children believe that phys-
ical events have causes by at least 5 years of age. Research also
suggested that this belief might be present, at least for caused
motion events, in younger infants (e.g., Saxe et al., 2005; Luo et al.,
2009). The current study extends previous research beyond the
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case of caused motion and provides convergent evidence by using
predictive looking, intervention, and exploration as measures of
causal inference. Future research might investigate the develop-
mental origins of this belief in infancy. Just as infants may have
innate domain-speciﬁc knowledge about objects and their physi-
cal interactions and agents and their goal-directed actions (Spelke
and Kinzler, 2007; Carey, 2009), the belief that all events have
causes may be part of infants’ core causal knowledge, integrating
information across domains and guiding the development of intu-
itive theories in early childhood. Alternatively, children may only
infer that all physical events have causes over the ﬁrst 2 years of
life as they acquire experience viewing causal events, and causing
events to occur themselves.
We have argued that the toddlers in the current study inferred
that there was a cause of the light’s ﬂashing when it appeared
to occur spontaneously and that they accepted the button as a
plausible candidate cause. However, our results cannot tell us
whether toddlers inferred that the button was the cause of the
light’s ﬂashing, or simply a potential cause of the light’s ﬂashing.
That is, toddlers in the Spontaneous condition may have treated
the button as a potential cause of subsequent activations of the
light without inferring that it caused the original light ﬂash. Simi-
larly, toddlers in the Spontaneous condition may not have inferred
the presence of a hidden cause when they saw the light activate on
its own, and nonetheless have been selectively motivated to attend
to (Experiment 1) and explore (Experiments 2 and 3) the plau-
sible cause when it became visible. Future research might try to
look at the timing of children’s inferences to see whether they
attribute causes as soon as they observe apparently spontaneous
events (and before they are shown plausible candidate causes) or
whether observing spontaneous events makes children selectively
attentive to plausible candidate causes when they subsequently
appear.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using artifacts to
assess toddlers’ causal reasoning. Toddlers have a lot of expe-
rience with lights turning on and off as a result of switches
or button. Thus, if there are any contexts in which toddlers
expect events to have causes, it should be for functional arti-
facts intentionally designed to have causal mechanisms in place.
If toddlers expect causes when artifacts change states, this expec-
tation may not extend to other kinds of physical events, let alone
to biological, psychological and social events. In Experiments 1–
3 we also provided toddlers with a plausible, familiar candidate
cause: a button. Whether toddlers accept and explore a wider
array of candidate causes to account for otherwise unexplained
events remains an area for further inquiry. However, focusing on
artifacts allowed us to look at whether toddlers posit candidate
causes for unexplained events when they have the strongest reason
to do so.
The expectation that physical events have causes allows learn-
ers to posit the existence of unobserved causes whenever events
appear to occur spontaneously. However, toddlers might also
make a stronger assumption: they might assume that causes pro-
duce their effects deterministically (Laplace, 1814/1951; Schulz
and Sommerville, 2006). A learner who makes this assumption
can posit unobserved causes whenever events appear to occur
stochastically: the learner may conclude either that a generative
cause is sometimes missing or that an inhibitory cause is some-
times present. Some recent work in our lab suggests that toddlers
may also make this inference (Wu et al., 2013) but further research
remains necessary.
How toddlers acquire the inference that events have causes and
constrain their hypothesis space in searching for candidate causes
is an open question. Toddlers’ persistent exploration of the light
box itself in the Spontaneous condition of Experiment 4 provides
suggestive evidence that toddlers’ belief that unexplained events
have causes might guide toddlers’ exploration and discovery of
genuinely novel causal mechanisms. Given that physical contact
has been shown to facilitate infants’ causal reasoning (Leslie, 1982;
Cohen andAmsel, 1998) and appears to be a default expectation in
children’s causal reasoning (Kushnir and Gopnik, 2007), the phys-
ical connection between the button and the light box likely also
guided toddler’s causal search. Futureworkmight look at how tod-
dlers’ decisions about exploration trade-off the expectation that
events have causes with inferences about the size search space, as
well as how their expectations about spatial contact between causes
and outcomes changes over development.
The current study suggests that toddlers will look for, intervene
on, and explore plausible causes of otherwise apparently sponta-
neous events. This behaviormayhelp support learning throughout
development. If young children assume that physical events have
causes, then seemingly spontaneous events can become a target for
exploration and discovery, ultimately supporting the rich inquiry
into non-obvious, unobserved, and even unobservable variables
that characterizes human cognition.
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